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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Jon Curtis May argued in his opening brief that the district court erred in denying 
his motion to suppress because the State did not meet its burden of establishing his 
warrantless search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant 
requirement or was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances.  In its brief, the 
State argues Mr. May failed to preserve this issue for appellate review and, in any 
event, the search of Mr. May was valid based either on his waiver of his Fourth 
Amendment rights or under the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant 
requirement.  The State is incorrect and its arguments should be rejected.  Mr. May 
argued in the district court that he was searched and seized in violation of his Fourth 
Amendment rights and the State did not meet its burden of proving the search and 
seizure were reasonable.  The district court thus erred in denying his motion to 
suppress.   
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. May included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in his opening 
brief.  (App. Br., pp.1-4.)  He incorporates that statement herein by reference.   
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ISSUE 
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. May’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. May’s Motion To Suppress 
 
 
A. Mr. May Preserved His Claim That He Was Searched In Violation Of The Fourth 
Amendment Of The United States Constitution 
 
 Mr. May preserved in the district court the claim he seeks to raise on appeal—
that he was searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.  “For an objection to be preserved for appellate review, either the specific 
ground for the objection must be clearly stated or the basis of the objection must be 
apparent from the context.”  State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho 364, 367 (Ct. App. 2015).  
The purpose of the preservation requirement is to “ensure[ ] that the trial court has an 
opportunity to consider and resolve disputes at a time when the error can be prevented, 
mitigated, or cured.”  Id. at 368. 
Mr. May filed a one-page motion to suppress in the district court, stating the basis 
for his motion was that he “was arrested in violation of Idaho Code § 20-227.”  
(R., p.30.)  At the hearing on Mr. May’s motion to suppress, counsel for Mr. May argued 
Mr. May was arrested in violation of this statute and “[t]hey detained him without any 
probable cause or reasonable suspicion of any wrongdoing” which “reach[es] the level 
of [a] constitutional violation.”  (10/19/15 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-13.)  He argued, “And so I think it 
is a Fourth Amendment violation of an illegal search and seizure because they don’t 
have authority to stop him, period, and the only authority they can rely on [is that] 
probation told us he absconded.”  (10/19/15 Tr., p.6, Ls.14-18.)  The prosecutor 
recognized “the real issue is whether the detention complied with [Mr.] May’s waiver of 
parole or probation in this particular case,” though noted the motion was not pled that 
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way.  (10/19/15 Tr., p.5, Ls.10-15.)  The district court likewise recognized “there was a 
seizure . . . and the question is whether or not that seizure was authorized on the 
various theories.”  (10/19/15 Tr., p.7, L.24 – p.8, L.1.)   
 The State also argues this Court cannot consider Mr. May’s argument because 
he did not receive an adverse ruling from the district court.  (Resp. Br., p.6.)  Mr. May 
did receive an adverse ruling from the district court, which issued a written order 
denying his motion to suppress.  (R., pp.68-72.)  This order forms the basis for his 
assignment of error, and is reviewable.  See, e.g., State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 384 
(1999).  The fact that the district court did not consider whether Mr. May waived his 
Fourth Amendment rights as part of his probation agreement and whether the search 
and seizure were otherwise reasonable does not mean the reasonableness of the 
search and seizure were not preserved for this Court’s review.   
This Court exercises free review over whether a constitutional violation has taken 
place in light of the facts found by the trial court.  See State v. Green, 158 Idaho 884, 
886 (2015).  In denying Mr. May’s motion to suppress, the district court issued written 
findings of fact, which this Court can consider in reviewing the legal issue of whether 
Mr. May’s constitutional rights were violated by Officer Love’s search of his person.  
Mr. May raised his Fourth Amendment argument in the district court and thus preserved 
for review the issue he seeks to raise on appeal. 
 
B. The State Did Not Meet Its Burden Of Proving Mr. May’s Search And Seizure 
Were Reasonable 
 
 Turning to the merits, the State first contends Mr. May “voluntarily waived his 
Fourth Amendment rights as an express condition of his probation” and therefore “had 
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no Fourth Amendment rights that could be violated.”  (Resp. Br., pp.6-7.)  Mr. May does 
not contest that a parolee may waive his Fourth Amendment rights by executing a valid 
parole agreement that contains a Fourth Amendment waiver.  However, the State did 
not introduce sufficient evidence here to show Mr. May entered into such an agreement.  
Compare with State v. Ellis, 155 Idaho 584, 587 (Ct. App. 2013) (district court denied 
defendant’s motion to suppress concluding, inter alia, that he “waived his Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches pursuant to a parole 
agreement and the parole agreement was still in effect when enforcement entered his 
apartment”).  The State introduced a document which appears to be an excerpt from 
Mr. May’s parole agreement, and which appears to contain a Fourth Amendment 
waiver.  (Exs., p.5.)  Probation and parole officer Garcia testified Mr. May signed up for 
probation prior to June 17, 2015, and signed a waiver.  (10/19/15 Tr., p.3-15.)  But there 
is no evidence the particular probation agreement that was initialed by “JM” and 
admitted into evidence was still in effect on June 17, 2015, when Mr. May was arrested.   
The State also contends “even ignoring [Mr.] May’s waiver, his search did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment because it was conducted incident to his lawful arrest.”  
(Resp. Br., p.7.)  The State had the burden of establishing that a valid exception to the 
warrant requirement applied, see State v. Armstrong, 158 Idaho at 370, and did not 
meet its burden here.  Mr. May’s arrest was not lawful, and the search of his person—
conducted after he had been “placed . . . on the ground”—violated his rights under the 
Fourth Amendment.  (10/19/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.29-25.)   
First, Officer Love did not have probable cause to arrest Mr. May when Mr. May 
knocked on the door of a woman on misdemeanor probation.  The officer might have 
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had reasonable suspicion to believe Mr. May had absconded from probation, but his 
suspicion did not rise to the level of probable cause, and he knew no written agent’s 
warrant had been issued.  The fact that Mr. May “took off running” when the officer 
asked him to put his hands behind his back and then “grabbed a hold” of his hands 
does not somehow justify the officer’s decision to chase Mr. May and wrestle him to the 
ground.  (10/19/15 Tr., p.12, Ls.11-18.)  Officer Love could certainly have asked 
Mr. May questions about his probationary status or why he was present at that 
particular location, but he could not demand that he put his hands behind his back and 
then make chase.   
Second, Officer Love’s actions were not lawful simply because Mr. May knocked 
on the door while the officers were conducting a residence search of a woman on 
misdemeanor probation.  The cases cited by the State in support of its argument to the 
contrary are distinguishable, as they involve the execution of a search warrant, not a 
probationary search, and involve individuals who were either occupants of the residence 
to be searched or who were found at the residence at the inception of the search and 
whose identity and connection to the residence were unknown.  See State v. Reynolds, 
143 Idaho 911, 914-16 (Ct. App. 2007) (discussing Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 
(1981); State v. Kester, 137 Idaho 643 (Ct. App. 2002); and State v. Pierce, 137 Idaho 
296 (Ct. App. 2002)).  As in Reynolds, the facts available to the officers here would not 
justify Mr. May’s detention even if this Court were to extend the holdings of Summers, 
Kester and Pierce to probation searches.  See Reynolds, 143 Idaho at 916.  The 
officers conducting the probation search knew Mr. May, and did not express any 
concern regarding weapons in the residence generally, or on Mr. May in particular.   
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Third, Officer Love could not detain Mr. May merely because he fled from him, 
and could not lawfully arrest Mr. May after he observed him attempt to consume some 
pills.  (Resp. Br., pp.11-12.)  The State argues that “[s]eeing [Mr.] May possess the 
contraband gave the officer sufficient probable cause to lawfully arrest him” and “[t]he 
search incident to that lawful arrest was therefore valid.”  Officer Love testified he “could 
tell [Mr. May] was trying to eat some pills that were in a pill bottle that was in one of his 
pockets.”  (10/19/15 Tr., p.13, Ls.6-8.)  The State did not and could not prove that 
Officer Love’s observation provided probable cause for him to arrest Mr. May for 
possession of a controlled substance (or anything else).   
The State simply did not meet its burden of proving Mr. May’s search and seizure 




For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in his opening brief, 
Mr. May respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order of judgment 
and commitment, reverse the order denying his motion to suppress, and remand this 
case to the district court for further proceedings. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 2016. 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      ANDREA W. REYNOLDS 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
 8 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 13th day of October, 2016, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF, by causing to be placed a 
copy thereof in the U.S. Mail, addressed to: 
 
JON CURTIS MAY 
INMATE #86806 
ISCI 
PO BOX 14 
BOISE ID 83707 
 
MICHAEL R CRABTREE 




ATTORNEY AT LAW 
E-MAILED BRIEF 
 
KENNETH K JORGENSEN  




      __________/s/_______________ 
      EVAN A. SMITH 
      Administrative Assistant 
 
AWR/eas 
 
